The World Bank is entering a new era of developing strategies in microenterprise finance for banking with the poor. The issues in attaining sustainable banking with the poor find common ground with rural finance. The poverty pyramid is primarily composed of the rural poor. Urban poverty is the result of the rural poor moving to urban centers in search of better opportunities.
Bank policies as embedded in Operational Directive 8.30 have shifted from the fund transfer objectives of traditional agricultural credit projects to those of building viable financial institutions which operate within the purview of the rural financial market. However, this has presented a significant challenge and has had a decidedly negative impact on the volume of agricultural credit lending. This study was inspired by the need to learn how to design and implement realistic projects consistent with these policies.
The Financial Sector Development Departnent is continuing its research efforts with case studies of financial institutions in different parts of the world which have succeeded in providing access to credit to small farmers, women and the landless poor. We are also conducting country case studies to identify lessons to be leamed and opportunities to demonstrate that viable rural finance and sustainable banking with the poor are in fact attainable objectives.
We hope that this study, and follow-up studies which it has triggered, will reignite the interest and rebuild the confidence of Bank staff working in the field of rural finance. We also hope that the finding of these studies will serve as a guide to those who face the challenges of the new world of banking with the poor. The agricultural credit portfolio of the World Bank has declined sharply during the past five years. This decline coincides with the time period that the Task Force Report on Financial Sector Operations was circulated and subsequently followed by the issuance of Operational Directive 8.30 (OD 8.30 ). In its review of the Bank's agricultural credit portfolio, the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) traced the decline in lending to the adverse reaction to the operational directive. The OED report considered OD 8.30 to be too restrictive and the decline in lending unwarranted because agricultural credit projects had performed comparatively well. In addition, the OED report stated that agricultural credit projects had a positive impact on agricultural production. Therefore, the OED report recommended that the OD be revised. ' 
2.
Bank management, on the other hand, took the position that the decline in lending was justified in lieu of the poor performance of agricultural credit projects and that OD 8.30 in its present form was sound as well as adequately flexible. Management was of the view that rural finance projects can be properly designed if task managers were given guidelines on how to design projects based on best practices. It is the premise of this study that OD 8.30 in and by itself is not the source of the problem. Rather, the problem lies in the interpretation of the provisions of the OD and in translating such provisions into effective project design.
3. This study analyzes all of the Bank's on-going rural finance projects to arrive at best practices in project design, particularly with reference to the provisions of the OD. Almost all of these on-going projects were approved from 1988 onwards, the period in which agricultural credit lending took a sharp downward decline. These projects were most likely to reflect the implications of OD 8.30 on design features. Design features of on-going rural finance projects were compared to pinpoint best practices. In addition, design issues were identified and conclusions reached on these issues. On the basis of these conclusions, guidelines have been proposed to assist in designing sound rural finance projects. 4 . As a continuing effort on research on design issues, case studies are being carried out on successful rural finance institutions to resolve some outstanding issues in the field and to reinforce the conclusions of this study. One such study has recently been completed and is cited in this report. It is envisioned that interest in the shrinking field of rural finance will be reignited with examples of successful institutions and the presentation of guidelines on the effective design of projects.
II. STUDY FRAMEWORK
5. OD 8.30 was used as the policy frame of this study. The extent to which provisions of the OD were complied with and how specific provisions were translated to project design were examined. Design issues were also identified on the basis of commonly held concepts on rural financial market development. In addition, design features which appeared to have a direct bearing on project performance were singled out.
Concept of Rural Financial Market Development
6. The concept of rural financial market development views rural finance as a process of intermediation whereby rural deposits are mobilized and channeled into productive rural enterprises. In this concept the institutional capability and financial viability of the financial intermediaries is a prime objective. This is in sharp contrast to the objective of traditional credit projects which transfer funds to identified beneficiaries with little regard to the welfare of the financial institutions.
7.
The concept is premised on the observation that a significant proportion of the deposits generated by the financial system come from the rural sector. Commercial banks are primarily deposit takers in the rural areas but are hesitant to lend to agriculture. Commercial banks do not have the institutional capacity to reach small farmers and manage risk in agricultural lending. Furthermore, transaction costs are significantly higher in agricultural loans than loans commercial banks normally provide. In the process of intermediating rural deposits to urban investment, capital is invariably moved out of the rural sector. While a net outflow of capital from the sector may be a normal phenomenon of economic development, the hesitation of commercial banks to lend to agriculture has motivated governments to reverse this outflow and rechannel funds to agriculture by establishing specialized rural credit institutions. Consequently, a common feature of the countries studied is the existence of government-owned specialized agricultural credit institutions. In some cases, governments compel commercial banks to lend to agriculture or to deposit funds with the specialized agricultural credit institutions.
8.
On the other hand, it is conceivable to have a situation whereby commercial banks specialize in deposit taking while agricultural banks specialize in retail lending and credit. In some countries, agriculture banks do not take deposits and depend entirely on external sources of funds. This system is not a preferable one as it increases government intervention and has given rise to many of the problems common to specialized agricultural banks in developing countries.
9.
The preferred strategy is to strengthen the process of rural financial intermediation, taking into account that commercial banks are averse to lending to agriculture and an unimpeded accelerated flow of resources out of the rural sector would have negative effects on the sector. The approach is to transform specialized agricultural credit institutions into competitive market-based, diversified, financially viable rural financial intermediaries which can mobilize resources and channel these into productive rural enterprises. The strategy supports developing local depositbased rural financial institutions and the linking of the informal credit system with the formal financial sector. This strategy should not result in market segmentation as long as institutions are competitive and market-based. This conceptual framework proposes a strategy of shifting from agricultural credit to ruralfinance. 2 
Features of Operational Directive 8.30
10. The operational directive recognizes that financial systems provide services vital to economic growth and development. The speed and efficiency of growth of the real sectors are ultimately linked to the efficient development of the financial sector. The major objective of the Bank's assistance is the promotion of efficient financial systems.
11
. A full range of Bank instruments are available to support financial sector development such as structural adjustment loans, sector adjustment loans, financial intermediary loans (FILs), technical assistance loans and country economic and sector work. OD 8.30 states that these instruments should be mutually supportive in financial sector operations in specific country circumstances. When a financial sector adjustment loan is used to support general sector reform, the conditionality of FHLs focuses on the development of intermediary institutions and financial instruments. In the absence of financial sector reform, FlLs may have to take a broader policy perspective.
12. OD 8.30 lays out the objectives of FILs within a broad financial sector development strategy. FILs should conform with financial sector policies and address issues such as interest rates, directed credit and targeted subsidies. The OD also establishes guidelines for institutional arrangements as well as eligibility requirements of participating financial institutions. It is within this policy frame that the design issues in rural finance projects were studied for this review.
III. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 13 . The study covered all rural credit projects and projects with rural credit components which were on-going as of the end of 1993. Most of these projects were approved from 1988 onwards. This period experienced an abrupt decline in the number and in the volume of Bank lending. As shown in the table 1, lending to countries with market economies for credit projects almost disappeared, declining from $813.5 rnillion to only $104.7 million with nine projects approved in 1988 to only one in 1992. What held up the volume of lending were credit projects in socialist countries where the full force of OD 8.30 may not have been applied and credit components which may not have been subjected to the scrutiny of OD 8.30.
14. The decline in the lending portfolio is not confined to agricultural credit lending. Small and medium enterprises (SME) lending suffered a more drastic decline from a volume of $635 million in 1989 to only $59 million in 1993. The reasons for the decline in SME lending are simnilar to those for rural finance. Some reference will, therefore, be made to the experience in SME lending in reaching the conclusions of this study. 15 . A computer search using agriculture as the primary sector and agricultural credit as the secondary sector identified 22 on-going projects. The study included 16 stand-alone agricultural credit projects and 6 semi-stand-alone projects. The semi-stand-alone projects were credit components of other projects that constituted 70 percent or more of the Bank loan. The number of projects reviewed in this study did not coincide with the data from the OED report because of a difference in the basis of classification of agricultural credit projects. The list of ongoing projects included in the study is presented in Annex 1. 16 . The study analyzed staff appraisal reports, loan agreements, supervision mnission reports (Form 590s) and financial statements of participating financial institutions. Interviews with Task Managers were conducted as necessary to obtain detailed and up-to-date information. Whenever appropriate, relevant information was also drawn from recent experience in designing rural finance projects.
17. Table 2 summarizes the availability of financial data for the 22 on-going projects. Data on financial performance were usually difficult to obtain. There were some inadequacies on data contained in staff appraisal reports, but the greatest deficiencies were noted in supervision mission reports. Vital information which should have been gathered regularly during supervision to monitor the performance of financial intermediaries such as the yearly audited financial statements was not always available. Most loan agreements required audited statements of project accounts, but not of the participating bank. While information on interest rates appears to be readily available, the nature of the information on recovery rates was insufficient both in appraisal reports and supervision reports. Data on the aging of arrears was almost always unavailable both during appraisal and supervision. Recovery rates were seldom desegregated to show recovery of current dues and arrears. It should be noted that this lack of financial data is inconsistent with the requirements of OD 8.30.
18. Rural finance projects fall under the classification of Financial Intermediary Loans (FILs). OD 8.30 contains specific provisions for these loans. The study identified design issues when: * Design features did not conform with the provisions of OD 8.30 or the provisions of the OD were difficult to comply with; * Design features considered essential in commonly held concepts on rural financial market development were not found in credit projects; * Design features contributed to poor performance of projects or financial intermediaries.
19. The study does not ignore the need for and the impact of rural credit on the real sector. It was not designed to measure access to credit of the intended beneficiaries or assess production impact of the credit projects. Apart from the difficulty of developing a methodology of measuring production impact, time series data on rural households, which could reveal the impact of ciedit on technological change, production, employment and income were not available. Some rural finance projects have only recently included rural financial market studies, which include rural household surveys, in project design. The study, therefore, focused on the problems of the performance of financial intermediaries. 
22.
Experience. The Bank has traditionally supported specialized rural finance institutions which are usually government owned and controlled. However, there is a growing trend in rural finance projects to expand participation to include other banks in addition to the specialized rural finance institution. In fact, there have been recent cases of project staff being required by senior management to devise apex arrangements to include several commercial banks as participating banks, apparently in line with the objective of broadening financial markets. 5 23. Of the 22 on-going projects studied, 10 projects involved single specialized credit institutions (table 3) . Projects with single participating institutions showed better performance than projects with apex arrangements. Of the 10 projects with single participating institutions, supervision reports showed that there were comparatively fewer projects meeting implementation problems. In terms of project disbursement, there were only 2 projects out of the 10 projects which had disbursement lags of more than 50%. Box 1 provides an example of a specialized credit institution in Morocco. have met implementation problems due commercial banking and foreign banking primarily to the lack of interest of the operations.
participating banks. As a result, 7 of the 12 projects with apex arrangements had The latest project in implementation disbursement lags of more than 50%. All (National Rural Finance) will help CNCA to but one of these projects did not have a promote private investment in rural areas. The specialized credit institution serving as the objective is to develop a sustainable and major channel. The majority of these financially sound rural finance program that projects are located in one region where can operate in a liberalized financial system. specialized rural finance institutions have The project will fund medium and long-term been abolished or never existed. credit to private farmers and investors for onfarm and off-farm investments. It will 26. The problem of the lack of strengthen CNCA's planning, management participation of financial institutions in and drought management. apex lending can be traced to the lack of BOX 1 interest among commercial banks. Several reasons were given in supervision reports for this lack of participation, i.e. low interest rates, high intermediation cost, low loan recovery, competition by the apex bank and macroeconomic factors.
27. Commercial banks normally serve a very limited agricultural clientele. There were only three projects which effectively involved commercial banks. In all three cases, a satisfactory rate of disbursement was due to loans being granted to large borrowers. For example, in one project there were only 29 projects approved for $11 million of loans. Most of these loans were for agroindustry. 6 6 28. All loans reviewed for the study financed agricultural production as a primary objective (crop culture, livestock husbandry and, occasionally, fisheries development). Thirteen projects had provisions for financing farm inputs, farm machinery, irrigation and equipment. As many as 15 projects included financing of agroprocessing, marketing and/or transport. Only 5 projects financed non-farm rural enterprises in addition to agriculture. Only these projects can be considered diversified (table 4) .
32. Farmers and producers were the targeted beneficiaries in almost all projects. About half of the projects made provisions for financing cooperatives, farmers associations and other legal entities.
Only three projects specifically mentioned targeting women; one project mentioned landless individuals. While there is the presumption that small farmers, rural women and the landless are poor, projects were not specifically designed to reach individuals at the lower rung of the poverty pyramid. Only two projects involving commercial banks did not specify a targeted group of borrowers. 
Outstanding Issues.
The issue at hand is whether rural finance projects should continue to be narrowly targeted to agricultural production. Should the scope of rural finance projects be broadened to include all types of non-farm rural enterprises? Is there evidence that diversification will alleviate the problems of specialized finance institutions? On the other hand, is some form of targeting essential, particularly in dealing with the rural poor?
Availability of information on ruralfinancial markets
34. Policy. The major thrust of financial sector reform is the development of market-based financial systems. The willingness of savers to hold domestic financial assets depends on macroeconomic conditions. Competition in financial markets results in the efficient allocation of financial resources. The decision to invest in rural enterprises is influenced by economic factors such as interest rates and prices. In carrying out financial sector operations, OD 8.30 provides guidelines pertaining to a wide variety of country circumstances. These guidelines presume an adequate amount of information on macroeconomic conditions and financial markets.
35.
Experiece. While market-based lending is the principal thrust of financial sector development strategies, the rural finance projects reviewed proceeded with very little or no information at all on rural financial markets. All rural finance projects have been carried out on the presumption that there is a demand for medium-to long-term loans for items which normally bear a high foreign exchange component. This presumption mirrors more the nature of the Bank's lending instruments rather than a careful assessment of credit demand.
36. The lack of information on rural financial markets is a major deficiency of staff appraisal reports. Information that could serve as a basis for project design was unavailable, i.e investment opportunities, credit demand, access of rural borrowers to formal credit, capacity of the informal market to finance development, household savings, and transaction costs of borrowers.
Only recently have some rural credit projects included components for credit studies.
37. Eight projects made provisions for credit studies. Three projects were to conduct comprehensive rural financial market studies; one project was to study the informal credit market. The other projects were to study credit policy, deposit mobilization and agricultural insurance ( Market determination of interest rates is an essential element of competition. Administratively fixed interest rates impose barriers to efficient financial intermediation. Thus, the interest rate structure is a central concern of the Bank's economic dialogue with borrowing countries. 9 40. The minimum requirement set by OD 8.30 is for the rate to be positive in real terms. Furthermore, the spreads between borrowing and lending rates should be sufficient to cover operating costs, make prudent risk provisioning, and result in adequate profit. Where credit subsidies exist, the OD is explicit in its objective of reducing and eventually phasing these out. The OD also notes that it is preferable to finance credit subsidies from the fiscal budget in order to enhance transparency and regular review. and include a farm credit survey; (2) Studies analyzing the role of cooperatives in the agricultural subsectors.
41. In countries with annual inflation rates of below 10%, OD 8.30 states that interest rate liberalization can be phased in over a short period of time. In countries with projected annual infl ation rates of above 10% but below 30%, maintenance of a fully administered interest rate system may be justified although it is desirable to approximate market levels. For countries where inflation exceeds or is projected to exceed 3 0 %, financial sector operations would require a particularly strong justification."' 42. OD 8.30 states that where interest rate distortions are significant, Bank financial sector operations should normally be conditioned on an agreed program of adjustment in interest rates towards market rates and the introduction of a satisfactory mechanism where one does not already exist.
43.
Experience. Of the countries with on-going rural finance projects, annual inflation ranged from 1% to more that 3000%. Supervision reports monitored interest rates in 14 out of the 22 projects studied. However, lending rates were not adequately monitored. Actual lending rates were reported in only 5 projects while in 9 projects positivity of interest rates were reported without specifying the actual lending rates. Twelve projects reported negative interest rates. Four of these projects resorted to lending in foreign exchange to overcome the problem of having to charge very high rates on local currency loans as domestic inflation was exceedingly high.
44. The level of interest rates to end-users was the major policy conditionality in rural finance projects. Out of 22 on-going projects, 14 projects had interest rate covenants while 8 did not. Loan agreements stated that interest rates should be positive in real terms in 10 cases while in 3 cases interest rates were to be market determined. Only one project's loan agreement specified that the interest rate should cover all the costs of the financial institution (table 6 ).
45. Experience shows that interest rate covenants were difficult to enforce. Five projects did not comply with the interest rate conditionality. Formal suspension or cancellation was resorted to in two cases. These two projects were in countries where the government rather than the financial institution set interest rates or where the overall interest rate structure was negative due to high inflation rates.
46. The degree to which interest rate conditionalities were enforced varied greatly. In some countries, the existence of a highly subsidized credit line was in direct competition with Bank financed lending. In other cases, the Bank took a more rigid stance. For example in one country, the loan covenant called for interest rates for agriculture loans to be positive. While one agricultural credit line was negative, the weighted average interest rate for all types of lending was positive. Violation of the covenant led to the cancellation of a part of the loan.,' Box 3 highlights the above mentioned project. The project began in 1989 with a loan of US$250 million. The project objectives were to increase the availability of agricultural credit and strengthen the agricultural credit institutions. The main agricultural credit institutions were the Agricultural Bank of Turkey and the Agricultural Credit Cooperatives. The project agreement included two covenants on interest rates. The first covenant stipulated that the weighted average interest rate for agricultural loans was to be positive in real terms by March 31, 1990. The second covenant stated that all agricultural interest rates were to be positive by March 31, 1991.
The covenant for the weighted average interest rate was met. However, failure to adjust nominal rates in the face of rising inflation prevented the second covenant from being met. Agricultural lending rates were positive for a few months in 1986 when the inflation rate was 28 percent and the lowest lending rate was 30 percent. Inflation increased and interest rates did not increase accordingly. During 1990-91, the Bank stressed to the Gcvernment the need to find ways to meet the covenant. Progress was further undermined by low recoveries in 1991 because borrowers expected remission of agricultural interest rates or principal. In 1992, interest rates remained negative. It was clear that the Government could not meet the conditions of the covenant. In June 1992, the Government requested cancellation of part of the loan. However, the technical assistance component remained intact under a trust fund agreement to continue progress in institutional development.
BOX3
47. Oiitstanding Issues. In view of the unsatisfactory experience with compliance, what should be the nature of credit policy conditionalities and how rigidly should these conditionalities be enforced?
Basis for continuing supportfor ruralfinance 48. Policy. A significant proportion of the Bank's rural credit portfolio consisted of follow-up projects in client countries. The drastic decline in rural credit lending may be attributed to the discontinuation of these loan series. Management decision favored the discontinuation of traditional support to rural finance projects on the grounds of the poor financial performance of participating institutions, based on the standards set forth by OD 8.30.
49.
Experience. Of the 20 countries studied, 14 countries had follow-up projects. Of these 14 countries, 7 had repeater projects involving the same institutions and 7 had successor projects with different institutional arrangements compared to the previous project. Six countries had no previous rural finance project (table 7) . 50. The study examined project completion reports (PCRs) and project audit reports (PARs) of the projects which were completed prior to the on-going projects being reviewed to determine the basis for continued support for rural finance. Of these projects, eleven completed projects were rated as satisfactory by OED. OED assessed the financial performance of only four projects of these 11. Three projects were reported to have satisfactory financial performance and one as having unsatisfactory financial performance. The reasons given for the satisfactory rating of the remaining 7 projects were the attainment of production objectives (5 * a positive return on equity, with realistic provisions for potential and identified losses; * an acceptable capital adequacy ratio-8% for a well managed commercial bank, 10% for a sound mature DFI and 20% for new DFIs or those with poor past performance; * a collection rate which avoids the erosion of capital, taking into account a realistic estimate of possible portfolio losses, inflation, and the opportunity cost of capital; * not more than 20% of loan portfolio has been rescheduled and less than 5% of the portfolio has been rescheduled more than once." 3 55
. If financial intermediaries demonstrate poor performance over a long period, the OD states that substantial corrective measures should be taken before they participate. The inclusion of these financial intermediaries requires an agreed upon institutional development plan with monitorable targets in such areas as financial performance, loan collections, capital adequacy, resource mobilization, managerial autonomy, data processing systems, credit and financial policies, staff skills, etc. Free standing technical assistance may be provided for this purpose." 4 56. Experience. The key financial performance indicators calculated for the projects when possible were: income to equity ratio, equity to loan ratio and recovery rate. Of the 22 rural credit projects studied, 15 presented financial statements and reported on recovery rates. Financial data were primarily available for specialized credit institutions.
57. Specialized financial institutions reveal weak income performance. Of the 13 projects where the return on equity was possible to calculate, only three projects met the criteria of positive return to equity. On the other hand, these institutions showed a strong equity base. All but one of the 8 institutions reporting had an equity to loan ratio of over 10%.
58. Recovery was reported in 15 projects. The predominant measure reported (11 projects) was the past due ratio. Another four projects reported the rate of recovery based on the amount due. One project reported the aggregate figure of collection as compared to loans granted over a number of years. A fourth way of reporting recovery was a cash flow measure in which collection was compared to disbursement. Due to the inconsistency of financial data, recovery performance of participating institutions was difficult to compare.
59. The recovery performance reported during appraisal was not satisfactory in about half of the projects on the presumption that a past due ratio of over 10% was unsatisfactory. Of the 11 projects reporting on past dues, 6 projects reported unsatisfactory recovery while 5 projects had satisfactory performance. Of the 5 projects with satisfactory performance, 3 were specialized credit institutions and 2 involved apex lending arrangements (table 9) . Performance in tnobilizing more deposits 62. Policy. The rural financial market development concept adopted in this report is built around the objective of increasing the capacity of rural financial institutions to mobilize rural deposits. The rural sector has sufficient capital resources which can be mobilized to develop the sector, provided that rural finance intermediaries are strengthened.
63. OD 8.30 supports the objective of deposit mobilization and requires financial institutions to increase over time the amount of funds mobilized competitively from the capital market. It goes further by providing a guideline for appraising financial intermediaries: the prudent limit of loans should be no more than 70% of deposits (or deposit to loan ratio of at least 140%).16
64. Experience. Twelve projects provided information in staff appraisal reports to allow calculation of loan-to-deposit ratios. The data shows that the financial institutions in five projects were able to finance loans entirely from deposits. These financial institutions were commercial banks. The 8 specialized rural finance institutions were able to finance loans only partially from deposits. The ratio of deposits to loans ranged from as low as 5% to as high as 92% with the majority being better than 50%. 7 The institution with the highest deposit to loan ratio was a diversified rural financial institution."' It was possible to determine the growth in deposits in only four institutions for which data were available at appraisal as well as during supervision. This data does not reveal a definite trend as two institutions showed an increase in deposit-to-loan ratios while two others showed no change or a decline.
66. Seven rural finance projects included savings mobilization as a design feature. Project components called for either increasing the amount of savings of financial institutions, increasing capacity of financial institutions to mobilize deposits, or promoting institutions which mobilize savings such as credit cooperatives. Qualitative assessment showed that the performance of rural finance projects in attaining the savings objective was dismal. Either the agreements were not complied with, interest was lacking, action was not taken on a timely basis, or the attempt was unsuccessful. Only one case was successful; another was moderately successful.' 9 Box 4 details the experience in resource mobilization. In the'Morocco project, one project objective is to increase domestic resource mobilization. The Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA) was to include deposit generation in its business plan. The implementation progress of this objective has been moderately successful as CNCA figures reveal that the relative share of short-term domestic resources in CNCA's total resources increased from 12% in 1988 to 17% in 1991. In terms of total deposits in the banking system as a whole, CNCA accounts for only 5% of the share. The issue of increasing CNCA's potential in savings deposits is being addressed under the follow-up project. One of the objectives of the National Rural Finance Project is to enhance CNCA's capability in domestic resource mobilization by continuing to develop new clientele such as women farmers, artisans, and Moroccans employed in foreign countries. 70. Several features of rural credit institutions characterize the lack of management autonomy:
BOX 4
* institutions supervised by government ministries rather than by central banks; * boards chaired by ministers and members who are predominantly functionaries of the government; * managers appointed by the national government rather than the board; and * exogenous committees which pass credit judgement on loan applications.
71. In addition, some policies and practices weaken the autonomy of credit institutions: * interest rates set by the government; * special government credit programs targeting high risk or unviable borrowers; * repayment guaranteed by the government; * rural credit used for relief operations when natural calamities occur; and debt forgiveness measures imposed on credit institutions.
72. Of the projects reviewed, four credit institutions were under a ministry such as the ministry of agriculture or finance. The other institutions were under central bank supervision. Financial institutions under central bank supervision are usually more autonomous. These institutions must comply with banking laws which apply to all banks. In some instances, however, supervision by the central bank did not assure independence because the government exercised control of the financial institution through the central bank. Special laws creating these institutions also gave the government more control.
73. The most common form of government control is in the determination of interest rates. Of 22 projects studied, interest rates were set by the government in 7 projects while restrictions were imposed by the government through central banks in three projects. Projects with apex lending arrangements experienced less interest rate interventions by the government. Of the 10 countries in which the government controlled interest rates, only two were under an apex arrangement. The remaining 8 projects involved a single participating institution, usually a specialized rural finance institution. Of the projects studied, a total of 12 involved financial institutions which had a free hand in determining interest rates. Most of these were under an apex lending arrangement. Box 5 provides examples of two projects with different levels of managerial autonomy--one project in Morocco and the other in Pakistan (table 10) .
MA.NAGERIAL AUTONOMY: The Morocco National Agricultural Credit and the Pakistan Agricultural Credit Project
The staff appraisal report for the National Agricultural Credit Project in Morocco notes that since 1987 the Government has taken measures to increase the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole's (CNCA) managerial autonomy. CNCA is the borrower for the Bank loan. The CEO is appointed by Royal Decree. The Board of Directors includes representatives from various ministries (Agriculture, Finance, Planning and Interior, etc). Although CNCA is under central bank supervision, it determines interest rates for lending.
The Agrictltural Development Bank of Pakistan has less managerial autonomy. The government sets interest rates and makes other key decisions. It appoints the Board of Directors. The lack of decision-making power impedes ADBP's institutional development and weakens its financial position.
These two projects illustrate how managerial autonomy can affect implementation. The Morocco project ended successfully in December 1993. A follow-up project (National Rural Finance) is in implementation. CNCA expects to continue making progress in increasing its managerial autonomy. In contrast, the last supervision mission rated the project in Pakistan poorly. In June 1994, the World Bank cancelled the loan amount remaining under funds for onlending.
BOX 5
74. There are at least three known cases in the Bank's recent rural finance experience of governments implementing debt relief measures. Two of these cases occurred in the rural finance portfolio being reviewed for this study and one case of a previously financed project in Jordan. 2 2 75. Outstanding Issues. In government-owned institutions, is it possible to attain managerial autonomy, particularly in establishing an appropriate interest rate policy and allocation of resources? 
Subsidies to Specialized Finance Institutions

76.
Policy. The OD advocates the removal of preferential treatment, protection and subsidy. The OD notes that "Bank support should be conditioned by the removal of any preferential treatment or protection that might give the FI an artificial advantage over other financial sector participants, actual or potential, and thereby insulate it from competition." 2 3 The OD also states that "prolonged subsidization could itself create a barrier to sustainability and eventual commercial access." 2 4 77. Experience. The Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) was used to determine sustainability. SDI has been calculated for four rural financial institutions participating in on-going projects. Data show that all four financial institutions were dependent on subsidy, with the level varying from 19% to 63% (table 11 ). The SDI is further explained in box 6.
78. The SDI was reported in another study for 7 financial institutions which are not currently being supported by on-going projects. Only one of these institutions operated without subsidy. This was the case of a commercial bank in which the major lending activity was not in agriculture. The agricultural lending was carried out in this case, to a large extent, for and on behalf of the government. The SDI was computed for the entire bank. 2 5 79. Two of the financial institutions considered to be better performers (Egypt and Morocco) had a higher absolute level of subsidy dependence, but with the level declining. The two institutions considered to be poorer performers (Pakistan and Turkey) had a lower subsidy, but with an increasing level. The data seem to indicate that the important factor is not so much the absolute level of subsidy but the direction the level is taking. As there are differences in the quality of financial data used, it is difficult to compare SDI estimates between financial institutions. Observation of trends may, therefore, be more relevant than cross institution comparisons.
80. Outstanding Issues. Can subsidy dependence be expected to be eliminated under all circumstances? According to J. Yaron, the subsidy dependence index as a measurement tool, can be described as follows:
Financial self-sustainability can be viewed as the inverse of subsidy dependence. A subsidy dependence index (SDI) is suggested for tracking the progress of an RFI in reducing its dependence on subsidies and for comparing the subsidy dependence of different RFIs providing similar services to a similar clientele. The SDI allows for a sensitivity analysis that measures the percentage increase in the average, on-lending interest rate required to compensate for complete and immediate subsidy elimination. For example, SDI of zero indicates that the RFI is fully self-sustainable; SDI of 100 percent means that the average, onlending rate used by the RFI must be doubled if operations are to continue without subsidies.
For simplicity, this interpretation assumes that an increase in the lending rate is the only change made to compensate for the loss of subsidies. However, the index does not imply that adjusting the interest rate is required or even feasible in all cases. The subsidy is measured against the interest the RFI earns on its annual average outstanding loan portfolio, since lending to a targeted clientele is the primary activity of a supply-led RFI.
BOX6
Financial Viability of Institutions
81.
Policy. OD 8.30 states that resource transfer alone is not a sufficient justification for financial intermediary lending. 26 As previously mentioned, one of the stated objectives of the OD in financial intermediary lending is to promote the development of the participating intermediary institutions. The OD envisions the attainment of full financial viability.
82.
Experience. This study attempted to determine if the financial performance of institutions improved over the course of the project. Only a few specialized credit institutions participating in on-going projects provided adequate information during appraisal as well as during supervision to serve as the basis for comparison. The time period elapsed between appraisal and the last supervision varied from three to six years.
83. The impact of rural finance projects on the financial performance of financial institutions was mixed. Of five financial institutions with data available, two institutions showed an improvement in the equity to loan ratio while three experienced a decline. Three institutions improved in income and two declined. In only one known case did the government regularly receive dividends from its investment in the institution. However, this institution was heavily dependent on grants from external sources. 27 84. Recovery performance is the major determinant of financial performance. Two financial institutions improved their recovery performance; two did not change or declined. It should be noted that the recovery performance of rural credit institutions was severely affected by natural calamities. 28 In several countries, land titling has not been completed so that loans are not fully secured. Thus, there is little recourse in cases of default. In countries where loans are fully secured, government controlled credit institutions find it difficult to carry out widespread foreclosure proceedings in natural calamity cases. It has been a practice in some countries to reschedule loans or forgive loans. Either the debt burden increased or credit discipline eroded. In both cases, recovery was affected negatively.
85. Outstanding Issues. The ultimate objective of rural finance projects is the attainment of financial viability of the institutions. Can specialized rural finance institutions attain financial viability and sustainability?
V. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 86. This section summarizes the findings of the study and draws the report's conclusions. The study identifies features of appropriately designed rural finance projects. It proposes how Bank policy, particularly the provisions of OD 8.30, should be interpreted and translated into project design. These conclusions then serve as the basis for guidelines proposed in the next section. In arriving at the conclusions of the study, reference is made to similar studies where findings shed more light on the issues and where conclusions are mutually supportive. A Bank study on lending for small enterprises is cited in this report. 29 A case study of the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand is the first of a series of case studies to resolve some outstanding issues or to reinforce the conclusions of this study. 30 Although BAAC discontinued borrowing from the Bank, it may be considered to be one of the best, if not the best, specialized credit institution the Bank has supported. Since BAAC became successful on its own, some conclusions can be drawn from its experience.
General Observations
87. The experience gained in conducting the study invariably leads to the observation that the problem of weak supervision overshadows the deficiencies in project design. The inadequacy of financial data needed to monitor the performance of financial intermediaries is a reflection of the poor quality of supervision. Yearly audited statements were rarely included in supervision reports. Where yearly audited statements were obtained, these were not analyzed adequately to provide guidance to financial institutions. Recovery rates crucial to institutional capability and financial viability were not reported regularly in supervision reports. The performance of project components took precedence over the more important goal of improving the financial viabilitty of participating intermediaries. 88. Based on the conclusions of this report, guidelines based on best practices were prepared and are presented in the next section to assist task managers in the preparation of future rural finance projects. The problem of supervision highlights the need for clear guidelines on assessing the financial performance of intermediaries. Improvement in the professional expertise of task managers is called for. Bank staff with the necessary acadenmic background and field experience should be employed to guide the development of rural financial institutions. Moreover, staff should be provided training and technical backstopping as needed.
Detennining the Objectives and Scope of Rutral Finance Projects
89. In reaching the conclusions on the issues related to the objectives and scope of rural finance projects, it is necessary to view rural finance from a broad perspective in terms of the nature of 20 clientele served. The client base can be viewed as an economic ladder in which the size of the enterprises are larger at the upper end of the economic ladder and declines towards the lower end of the economic ladder. At the bottom of this economic ladder, below the poverty line, is a "poverty pyramid". The top of the pyramid comprises the entrepreneurial poor, followed by the selfemployed poor, the laboring poor and finally the vulnerable poor at the very bottom.
90.
Bank projects for SMEs serve clients at the upper end of the economic ladder. These are comprised of larger enterprises which engage in non-agricultural business. The review of SME lending reveals that the average loan size is about $40,000 with average asset ceilings of almost $1,000,000 for the Bank portfolio as a whole. 3 ' The mniddle level is served by rural finance projects where the concentration of loans is in the $1,000 to $5,000 range. The bottom level is served by microenterprise projects with an average loan size of less than $500, with few loans being more than $1,000. There is a wide gap between the client base of SME and rural finance lending. However, there is a significant overlap between rural finance and microenterprise lending since most microenterprise finance projects are located in rural areas. Subsistence farmers are considered as the laboring poor because they do not produce for the market.
91. Financial intermediaries for SME lending are usually commercial banks, governmentowned specialized institutions for rural finance activities, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for microenterprise lending. Commercial banks are driven by the profit motive, specialized rural finance institutions are mandated by government to serve the rural sector, while NGOs have a mission to help the poor. As the size of enterprises and loans become smaller, competition in lending declines, credit projects become narrowly targeted, intermediaries become more specialized, dependence on subsidies is greater, and viability of lending takes a longer time to achieve. 92. Projects which cater to relatively large enterprises and in which the participation of commercial banks is expected, an apex arrangement is more appropriate rather than limiting participation to a single institution. An advantage of the apex lending arrangement is that it is easier to establish a market-based interest rate structure. It is feasible to design a general, nonsector specific credit line. Sectorwide objectives of broadening the financial markets and financial reform can be incorporated in such projects. There is, however, the possibility of negative targeting when agriculture is excluded from availing the general. credit line.
93. As the purpose of on-going rural finance projects is narrowly targeted to financing agricultural production, commercial banks have shown a lack of interest in participating in such projects. These projects have traditionally resorted to using single participating institutions serving as credit channels. While there is the advantage that project funds are disbursed faster by specialized institutions, projects have encountered problems in attaining satisfactory financial performance of the participating institutions. Establishing a market-based interest rate policy has also proven to be more difficult due to government control. Since improvement in the performance of rural finance institutions is key to the success of rural finance projects, limiting participation to specialized rural finance institutions will allow focus on institutional development. However, when competition in rural lending exists among formal institutions and the specialized rural finance institution is comparatively efficient, an apex structure is a desirable arrangement in attaining resource transfers and sectorwide objectives of rural finance projects. 94. Rural finance projects which are too narrowly targeted have resulted in high risk portfolios. In addition, this has led to the non-farm credit needs in rural areas being unrmet. There is some evidence that farm investment is not in all cases the farmer's priority enterprise, but rather nonfarm investments which are expected to yield additional sources of income. In addition, rural enterprises among non-farmn rural households also have a demand for formal credit. Some projects involving specialized rural finance institutions have lent for non-farm enterprises, but the proportion of the loan portfolio devoted for such lending activities is still negligible. Agricultural banks need to diversify their portfolio in order to improve risk management. Prudent risk management calls for the diversification of lending from solely to agricultural production to the broader objective of financing the full range of the rural sector's needs.
95. This study revealed some evidence to show that diversification enhances the financial stability of financial institutions. Out of the 22 projects analyzed, financial institutions of four projects met the eligibility criteria of OD 8.30. One project involves a commercial bank which has a highly diversified portfolio comprising of only a small proportion of agricultural finance loans. The other example of diversification is a specialized agricultural bank in which rural lending is less than half of the portfolio. In this case the non-agricultural portfolio has kept the agricultural bank afloat. The other two projects are relatively successful specialized rural finance institutions which are heading in the direction of portfolio diversification.
96. In microenterprise lending the impact on poverty alleviation is the primary objective. Loans are very narrowly targeted to reach the poorest of the poor. While NGOs have in most cases overcome the problem of loan recovery, which has plagued rural finance institutions, NGOs are faced with high transaction costs. As a result most NGOs are not financially viable as suLstainability is dependent on grant funds from donors. Assessing microenterprise projects, therefore, calls for a more flexible interpretation of Bank policy particularly on the issue of targeting and subsidy.
97. SME, rural finance and microenterprise lending all represent targeted lending. Raising the issue of targeting is considered to have caused the decline in the Bank's small enterprise lending. "Subsidized lending became confused wvith taigeted lending. Staff faced an steep uphill battle to obtain internal approval to process these projects. One result of this internal split in views is a virtual cessation in lending for SMEs because it represents targeted lending." 3 2 98. While the objective is to develop market-based lending, little is known about the rural financial market. Information that is needed includes credit demand, access to formal credit, transaction costs, nature of the informal market, attitude towards credit, and propensity to save, etc. Research is also necessary on the indicators of impact on technological change, labor employment, production and income.
99. Rural finance projects can only be selectively used as an instrument for attaining credit policy objectives. The high rate of non-compliance of credit policy conditionalities indicates that rural finance projects by themselves are not effective instruments in carrying out major changes in credit policy. Experience shows that credit policy, in particular interest rate policy, is difficult to achieve when the government rather than the financial institution sets the interest rates. The violation of covenants on credit policy has been the consequence of the lack of government commitment to the project's objectives. Enforcement of conditionalities requires resiliency without, however, losing sight of long-term viability objectives.
100. The case study on BAAC reveals an institution's long-term commitment to financial viability. BAAC does although have to be balanced between the development objectives of the government which owns it and its own financial welfare. The Bank took a flexible stand in the enforcement of the interest rate conditionality, recognizing the political realities faced by BAAC. The Bank did contribute to setting the proper course for BAAC, but BAAC eventually became successful on its own.
101. The lack of continuing support for rural finance projects has found a parallel in SME lending. The study on SME lending concluded that "SME lending programs that had achieved a high degree of success were abandoned.. .because they had become inconsistent with prevailing ideology." The decline in rural finance lending was not as drastic as the case in SME lending. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Bank support for rural finance was discontinued in about half of the countries where projects were rated as satisfactory. Thus, poor project performance was not the sole reason for the declining trend in Bank lending for rural finance. It appears that management decisions to scale down support for rural finance were made during the preparation of country economic strategies, as an over-reaction to OD 8.30.
Factors Affecting Sutstainability of Finance Intermediaries
102. Few rural financial institutions have met the eligibility criteria of OD 8.30. This should, however, not be taken as a disqualification nor grounds to completely abandon support for rural finance. The eligibility requirements of the OD should be interpreted as a test for mature and efficient financial institutions. The performance standards set forth are more appropriate if considered as long-term goals in rural finance rather than prequalifying requirements. The OD accommodates financial institutions which do not make the grade by providing that participation is premised on an agreed institutional development plan with verifiable qualitative and quantitative performance targets. The eligibility criteria should, therefore, not pose a threat to task managers in justifying well defined rural finance proposals. However, this should not minimize the need for more effective monitoring of the performance of financial institutions.
103. Self-sustainability of rural financial institutions is based on the ability to mobilize resources and attain financial viability. The experience shows that rural financial institutions can generate a significant amount of funds from deposits. The majority of institutions generate more than 50% of loan funds from deposits. Financing loans entirely from deposits is an attainable goal. In the case of BAAC, financial viability was reached and subsidy dependence almost totally eliminated when major strides were taken to generate more deposits. BAAC found that deposits proved to be a cheaper source of funds than borrowing.
104. The poor performance of projects in deposit mobilization is related to the narrow targeting of rural credit projects which limits deposit taking to farmers. Unless the scope of rural finance projects is broadened to include all segments of the rural population, the objectives of resource mobilization will be difficult to attain. It is necessary to build deposit mobilization capacity and pursue deposit mobilization campaigns aggressively in the entire rural sector. Furthermore, linking Bank lending to the amount of additional deposits generated is of utmost importance.
105. The ability of rural finance institutions to move towards self-sustainability depends on their capacity to adhere to sound credit practices and respond to market signals. This capacity is greatly weakened when governments rather than financial institutions make credit decisions. Since most Bank loans are negotiated with the government rather than directly with the rural finance institution, rural finance projects have invariably strengthened the hand of the government to influence the affairs of participating institutions. Furthermore, there are few covenants in rural finance projects which prescribe measures that will lead towards the institutions' autonomy.
106. Since management autonomy is a pre-condition towards the attainment of sustainability, the design of rural finance projects should emphasize the need to provide greater leeway for financial institutions to operate within the realm of the rural financial market framework. Identifying areas where the government's grip can be loosened as well as measures to strengthen the independence of rural financial institutions should be an essential feature of project design.
107. The case of BAAC shows that an efficient management system is possible under govermment ownership. BAAC has managed to strike a delicate balance between the development objectives of the government which owns it and its financial well-being. However, as there are limitations in working with government-owned agriculture banks, participation of private financial intermediaries such as deposit-based cooperative rural banks, poverty-oriented financial institutions, and other non-bank intermediaries should also be encouraged.
108. The SDI calculation is based on a set of assumptions on market interest rates and return on equity. While it is recognized that the SDI is not an exact measure, it approximates the level of subsidization. The difficulty lies, however, in the interpretation of the SDI.
109. There ate contrasting views on how subsidies to financial institutions should be treated. One view takes a rigid interpretation of the provisions of OD 8.30 as stated in paragraph 76. Some proponents of this view consider that targeted credit is a form of subsidy even if the loans are provided at market interest rates.
110. Another view is that subsidies can and have been used to pursue meaningful objectives; that not all subsidies need be eliminated immediately. Subsidy is a social cost; judgement of its worth should be based on the social benefits derived. Proponents of this view have opposed the mandatory calculation of the SDI for all financial intermediaries participating in Bank projects. While recognizing the usefulness of the SDI, it is feared that the SDI could be interpreted carelessly and lead to the further decline in financial intermediary lending.
111. Based on the analogy of the different types of clientele, this report is of the view that there are no grounds to provide subsidy to commercial banks which are driven by the profit motive and cater only to larger enterprises (paras. 91-92). In specialized rural finance institutions, the government is usually the owner and the return to investment is not always the primary objective. Therefore, some amount of subsidy is present as the institution fulfills its role as a major provider of credit to the rural sector. All specialized rural finance institutions in on-going projects are subsidized by some amount. Interest rates to end users should be market determined, however, subsidy to the financial institution is an unavoidable feature during certain stages of development. This is especially the case in financial institutions which serve the lower end of the economic ladder. The real test of an NGO is its non-profit nature. Subsidies to NGOs will be a permanent feature unless mature NGOs are transformed into formal financial institutions. This transformation concept is consistent with the four stages of development of microenterprise finance institutions. 3 " 112. The major conclusion of the case study of BAAC sheds light on the issue of subsidy. Subsidies were important in BAAC's development. The subsidies are utilized under able management in a prudent manner to build institutional capacity for the delivery of services. Subsidy dependence was slowly reduced and has been almost eliminated. It should be noted that this process has taken 20 years.
113. The attainment of financial viability should be considered an ultimate objective. It should be recognized, however, that financial viability is a long-term process. The impact on financial performance may not be immediately apparent during one rural finance project. Therefore, follow-up projects are needed to consolidate gains. The BAAC success story shows that a specialized bank owned by the government, lending exclusively to farmers under a less than ideal interest rate policy, can become successful contrary to general perception. BAAC received support from the government and external donors such as the World Bank. Eventually, BAAC attained success on its own.
VI. GUIDELINES IN DESIGNING SUCCESSFUL RURAL FINANCE PROJECTS
114. The following guidelines are based on the observations and conclusions drawn from the experience gained in the implementation of on-going rural finance projects and supplemented by observations from other projects. Four guidelines cover features which contribute to the effectiveness of rural finance projects. Another set of four guidelines include features to strengthen rural financial intermediaries.
Features Which Contribute to the Effectiveness of Rural Finance Projects
Institutional arrangements should be based on the characteristics of beneficiaries and willingness offinancial intermediaries to participate in rural lending.
115. There are both advantages and disadvantages in the different types of institutional arrangements. Apex arrangements allows equal access to Bank funds and broaden the rural financial market. Experience has shown that market-based interest rates are easier to establish in apex lending arrangements because participating institutions are generally free to set rates. This is particularly true in the case of commercial banks. In addition, apex arrangements are generally suited to projects in which the objective is to provide funds to a wide variety of enterprises including large agro-processing enterprises. The narrow targeting of agricultural producers in most rural finance projects has discouraged commercial banks to participate in such projects. Moreover, problems of disbursement are inherent when commercial banks are included in the design feature of rural finance projects which target agricultural producers. Apex arrangements are, therefore, best suited to projects which are designed to finance a wide range of enterprises.
116. Specialized rural finance institutions are generally more successful in attaining fund transfer objectives and are more willing to serve the credit needs of small borrowers. Experience has shown that there are significantly fewer problems of disbursement lags in rural finance projects involving these specialized institutions. These rural finance institutions are better positioned to finance agricultural production and investments and to serve beneficiaries at the lower end of the economic ladder such as small farmers, small rural enterprises, rural women and landless laborers. However, specialized rural finance institutions generally face difficulties in attaining a satisfactory level of financial performance. The major reason for this being that these institutions are government-owned and controlled. Establishing market-based interest rates has been problematic for these should, therefore, be based on pre-conditions as an assurance that these financial institutions will respond to market signals and move towards an acceptable level of financial viability.
Credit projects should be pre-conditioned on the government's commitment to provide ruralfinance institutions an acceptable level of autonomy.
117. The fundamental problem for specialized rural finance institutions is the lack of autonomy to adhere to sound credit practices and respond to market signals. In many instances, this lack of autonomy has led to financially unviable lending in compliance with the government's mandate to meet its development objectives. Conditionalities for management autonomy were not included in credit projects despite the provisions of OD 8.30 calling for strengthening the decision-making process of financial institutions.
118. Almost half of the credit institutions in on-going projects were not in a position to determine their lending rates. A few projects operated as agencies of ministries. Furthermore, dependence on government as an external source of funding contributed to the weakening of autonomy. Since government control of credit institutions has made financial viability a difficult objective to attain, assurance of an acceptable level of autonomy should be a crucial feature of rural finance projects.
119. At the design stage, rural credit projects should include an assessment of the level of autonomy. Statutes of credit institutions should be studied. In addition, the management structure should be examined by determining the composition of the board, who appoints managers, how staff are recruited and what personnel and management systems are in place. A commitment by government to allow such institutions management autonomy should be a precondition for initiating new projects or follow-up projects. A list of measures to increase autonomy should be drawn up at an early stage of project consideration.
120. If a minister chairs the board, it is desirable for the minister to step down and the board elect the chairman. It is also desirable that the board, rather than the government, select the general manager. Whenever possible, introducing private ownership and membership on the board, even to a limited extent, will contribute to greater autonomy. Transferring the supervision of the financial institution from a ministry to the central bank should also be a consideration.
121. Operating policies should be studied to determine the independence of the institutions in making credit decisions, setting interest rates and foreclosing on defaulted loans. Special credit programs implemented for and in behalf of the government should be clearly identified. Government practices for imposing debt forgiveness measures should also be noted. Lastly, an agenda of institutional reform measures to correct existing weaknesses should be agreed upon during appraisal.
A conducive credit policy should suipport mneasures to strengthen nrralfinance institutions.
122. A conducive credit policy framework is essential for the effective functioning and development of the rural financial system. These policies include interest rates, subsidized credit lines from other donors, credit quotas, directed credit lines, government guarantees and debt forgiveness measures. The most difficult policy to tackle is the interest rate policy.
123. Despite the need to rationalize interest rates, the Bank's experience in enforcing the conditionality to increase interest rates has often been unsuccessful. In reaching a decision on the interest rate conditionality, due consideration should be taken of the interest rate structure of the financial institution as compared to alternative sources of credit, the overall interest rate structure of the country, and the degree of independence of the participating financial institution to set rates.
124. In cases where agricultural interest rates are aligned with a distorted overall structure, other financial instruments instead of rural finance projects are more effective in facilitating interest rate policy reform. Where the interest rate structure of the financial institution is not aligned with the overall structure, a commitment to realign the interest structure of the financial institution should be obtained.
125. Interest rate reform can be achieved by allowing the financial institution the authority to set interest rates. If the government falls short of providing the institution an acceptable level of autonomy, particularly in the setting appropriate interest rates, policy reform should be dealt in conjunction with country economic dialogues and broader financial sector operations.
Credit projects should support research on ruralfinancial markets.
126. In countries where adequate information does not exist on rural financial markets, research should be included as a component of rural finance projects. The information collected can serve as the basis for the future design of credit projects, supervision of projects, and the measurement of the impact of these projects on production, employment and income.
127. This research should assess both the demand side and the supply side of the rural financial market. The demand studies should entail household level surveys to determine the use of credit, sources, terms and conditions, transaction costs, household savings, level of indebtedness, and impact on technological change, production, employment and income. It is preferable that household surveys be conducted at the beginning as well as at the end of the project to obtain an accurate assessment of project impact. In addition, a modestly sized national random sample would be useful for comparative purposes.
128
. The supply side studies should include the branch network of banks, deposit based local financial institutions, non-governmental institutions and informal lenders. The detailed terms of reference for these studies should be incorporated in project documents. Modest budgets should be provided for these studies. Research institutes, research units of government agencies or central banks, international organizations and consulting firms can be engaged in carrying out these studies.
Measures to Strengthen Rural Financial Intermediation
The decision to initiate a new orfollow-up credit project should be based on thefinancial institution's commitment to move towards financial viability and institutional strengthening.
129. While specialized rural financial institutions are effective channels for rural finance, a major weakness is financial performance. The study shows that only a few of these institutions can pass the rigid eligibility criteria embodied in OD 8.30. The impact of credit projects on financial viability over the course of a single project is not immediately apparent. It is apparent that subsidy dependence is a feature of rural finance institutions at the early stages of devi elopment and that subsidies can be decreased over time.
130. Attaining financial viability should be regarded as a long-term objective. Experience has shown that specialized rural financial institutions can achieve financial viability provided that there is a long-term commitment matched by strong and innovative leadership of the institution. A long-term relationship by the Bank through a series of rural finance projects matched by a firm stand on major issues and covenants can produce positive results. On the other hand, decades of support to financial institutions which do not have a commitment to move towards financial viability has not produced the desired results.
131. The commitment to achieve financial viability and institutional strengthening should be translated into a pre-agreed action plan. A five-year business plan should be prepared incorporating the measures to be taken to attain plan objectives with verifiable qualitative and quantitative targets. This plan should contain, whenever appropriate, a detailed assessment of the financial performance of the institution including the quality of its loan portfolio, study of lending policies and procedures, strategic planning process, organization and management study, and rural financial market studies. A commitment to implement the agreed plan should be incorporated in the project's conditionalities.
132. The factors crucial to financial viability are the interest rate structure, the administrative cost, the recovery rate, provisioning policy, and the adequacy of capital. Management information systems and internal controls which are necessary for accurate financial data and monitoring progress should also be in place. In cases where problems in loan recovery are prevalent, a recovery plan containing specific measures to be undertaken and planned targets should be prepared. It should be noted that commitment to implement the plan should be ascertained. When problems of excessively high administrative costs prevail, a plan to down-size operating costs and staff should be agreed upon at an early stage of loan procedures.
133. The interest rate structure is linked to the level of autonomy of the financial institution. There should be a commitment to adopt market rates. While it is not feasible to immediately eliminate credit lines with below market rates, the beneficiaries of these lines should be clearly identified and the relative proportion of funds should be contained. It is preferable to place these lines under the account of the government as off-balance sheet items with a commitment to phase out these lines over a reasonable period of time.
Ruralfinance projects shiould support thte diversification of rural credit institutions.
134. Diversifying the purposes for which loans are granted has several advantages. It would meet the credit needs of farmers for purposes other than agricultural production for which they may have a higher investment priority. Some evidence reveals that agricultural production is not always the farmer's investment priority. Creating additional employment and generating additional income can be a feature of both off-farm and non-farm rural enterprises. The experience in poverty alleviation projects in many countries reveals that the demand for credit was for purposes other than farm production.
135. Almost all specialized rural financial institutions were initially organized as agricultural banks for the purpose of providing credit to agricultural producers. Many of these institutions give priority to small farmers. As a result, lending has become narrowly confined to financing agricultural production. Rural finance projects have traditionally strengthened the specialization of these banks. There also seems to be a natural aversion among agriculture banks to venture into providing credit for non-farm enterprises among farm households and other rural enterprises among non-farm households.
136. Rural finance projects should encourage specialized financial institutions to cater to the needs of non-farm enterprises and non-farm households. Part of the problem of narrow specialization can be traced to the practice of identifying specific purposes for which project funds can be used at the design stage and calculating rates of return for selected sub-projects. Invariably, the choice of enterprises becomes limited to agricultural production. Rural finance projects should, therefore, encourage specialized financial institutions to serve the credit needs of the entire sector. Diversification would allow for the risk to be spread. In addition, higher interest rates could be charged on non-agricultural loans such as commercial loans resulting in wider interest rate spreads and higher yields. Lending to non-farm enterprises would also provide a greater variety of financial services to rural households. A more diversified lending program would contribute to widening the deposit base of financial institutions.
137. Financing should be made available for upstream enterprises such as suppliers of inputs for agriculture, manufacturers of farm equipment, marketing enterprises which directly or indirectly serve agriculture, agro-processing enterprises, warehousing, retailing, transporting, agro-tourism, etc. There are also a large number of cottage enterprises which rural women and the landless poor engage in -food processing, weaving, backyard enterprises, etc. The latter type of lending represents the link between rural finance and microenterprise finance.
138. It would be difficult for project designers to identify all these enterprises in advance as information on investment opportunities and credit demand is not available in the absence of rural financial market studies. Intermediary banks should be given the leeway to identify enterprises and clients and develop standards and procedures to assess loan applications. Rural finance projects should be designed to provide refinancing to intermediary banks for major categories of the loan portfolio. Technical assistance should also be provided to develop the capacity of financial institutions to cater to a more diversified clientele.
Bank funds should match rather than substitute forfunds generated from deposits.
139. Improvement in deposit mobilization is vital to the realization of self-sustainability of rural financial institutions. However, in practice deposit mobilization objectives have proven difficult to achieve. The lack of progress is attributed to several factors. The availability of Bank funds provides a disincentive for financial institutions to raise funds from the more difficult process of deposit mobilization. In most cases, rural finance projects have not linked the amount of the Bank loan with the amount of deposits to be generated. Agriculture banks have a limited capability to mobilize deposits as branches of agriculture banks are usually not accessible to rural depositors. Funds generated from deposits can prove to be more costly if the administrative costs are factored in or there are other sources of funds at below market rates. Deposits mobilized at commercial rates cannot be loaned profitably when an interest rate cap is imposed by the government. While farmers do save, there is a misconception that the bulk of savings will come from farmer-borrowers rather than from the rural population at large. There is also the problem of public trust of government-owned agriculture banks.
140. To encourage rural finance institutions to mobilize deposits, Bank funds should match the amount of funds these institutions generate from deposits. Major attention should be given to strengthening the capacity of sound institutions to mobilize deposits. This would come in the form of improved physical structures, appropriate equipment to maintain deposit accounts, training of staff, and improvement in the image of the financial institution. While rural financial institutions cannot be expected to finance loans entirely from deposits as envisioned by OD 8.30, experience shows that a significant proportion of loan funds can be obtained from deposits. Given the necessary attention and support for deposit mobilization, at least 50% and ideally 100% of the loan portfolio should be financed from deposits.
Ruralfinance projects should develop other credit channels.
141. The Bank limits the participation in rural credit projects to formal banking institutions. It should be recognized that these formal channels do have limitations. Commercial banks are deposit based, but are hesitant to finance agriculture and rural enterprises. Effective participation of commercial banks is limited to large clients. On the other hand, while specialized rural credit institutions are committed to agriculture and rural lending, these institutions are not deposit based, are controlled by governments, and may not be financially viable in the medium-term.
142
. Rural credit project design should be broadened to include private, local financial institutions and NGOs with a good track record. Consideration should be made to involving deposit basea local financial institutions such as credit unions, savings cooperatives, rotating savings and credit associations, and local rural banks which have experience in providing credit to rural households. The possibility of establishing regional banking structures such as regional cooperative banks should be explored to link these local institutions to the formal financial system and expand the process of rural financial intermediation.
143. The informal private money lender has been a reliable source of credit for rural households. These lenders provide credit primarily for household needs. Non-governmental initiatives such as private organizations have successfully financed microenterprises and have demonstrated their effectiveness in increasing access to credit for the entrepreneurial poor, the laboring poor, and rural women who do not meet the collateral requirements of banks. Some of these foundations have graduated into special purpose banks. The opportunity to include these non-governmental institutions should be explored in the context of expanding the scope of rural credit projects from agricultural credit to rural lending, including microenterprise finance.
26. OD 8.30, para. 54. 27. The Principal Bank for Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) in Egypt receives payment from the government for the interest rate differential of a subsidized line. However, the government collects annually an amount much larger than it provides to PBDAC. Since PBDAC receives substantial amounts of grants from external donors, the income collected by the government is essentially income accruing from such grants. 28. In a study carried out in connection with a follow-up project in Morocco, it was reported that as much as 3 0% of the entire cereal acreage would not be harvested in an extremely bad drought year. The losses for an insurance program which would guarantee 60% of the average yield is estimated at 15%. Drought could occur two years in succession as has happened recently in Morocco 
